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Article 8

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

may, however, encourage those who otherwise might consider
themselves quite alone in their speculations. The needs of
justice are certainly not served by acquiescing in the all-toofrequently encountered attitude of hopelessness. Daily newspaper accounts convince the informed reader that something
is out of balance. We will not acknowledge that the legal profession is bankrupt of the imagination to restore such balance.
George Morris Fay

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS: SAFEGUARDS FOR WITNESSES:
JUDICIAL PROTECTION AGAINST ABUSIVE PRACTICES:

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE
INVESTIGATIONS
The first half of this century, which has witnessed so
remarkable an expansion of both congressional and state
legislative action, has likewise been marked by the projection
of legislative investigative power far beyond the bounds
theretofore customary. Although many of these inquiries
have aroused bitter controversy, they have seldom been
challenged by invoking judicial review, and few such challenges have succeeded. After 1930, indeed, the opinion grew
ever more general that the power of Congress to conduct
investigations, in which evidence may be procured by compulsory process backed by penal sanctions, is substantially unlimited; and that judicial review of congressional investigations is largely theoretical and of small practical scope.
This attitude, nurtured during the between-war years, has
by now hardened into a preconception that is having a profound and not altogether beneficial effect on the behavior
alike of witnesses called before legislative investigating committees, and of the committees themselves. The fear of
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investigative omnipotence, as well as more discreditable
reasons, has caused witnesses by the hundred to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination. Frequently, I believe,
the plea was neither legitimate nor advantageous for the witness or the cause of truth. At the same time, some committees
have asserted an absolute power of inquisition, and have
exhibited a most dangerous arrogance in procedural matters.
But in fact, neither the political nor the judicial history of
legislative inquiries warrants these sweeping and unqualified
characterizations of their powers. Last spring, the Supreme
Court of the United States issued a timely reminder1 that the
"informing function" of Congress,' like the legislative power
to which it is ancillary, is subject to constitutional limitations
which are judicially enforceable. That decision, together with
the current and well-nigh explosive expansion and proliferation of investigative proceedings, makes timely another glance
at their history, a restatement of their place in the governmental structure, and an analysis of the scope of judicial
review of their conduct.
The Origins of Judicial Review
The historical roots of legislative investigations were skillfully explored and exposed by legal scholarship twenty-five
years ago.' The power of Parliament to conduct inquiries,
directly or through its committees, and to imprison contumacious witnesses in order to compel them to give testimony, was well recognized at least by the 17th century.4
While Parliament was in session this power was absolute,
and the courts would not entertain any challenge to the
Parliamentary warrant of arrest.' Colonial legislatures be1

United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
2 So described in WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1901).
3 Landis, ConstitutionalLimitations on the CongressionalPower of Investigation, 40 HARv. L. REv. 153 (1926); Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for
Contempt, 74 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 691, 780 (1926).
4 Landis, supra note 3, at 160-64.
5 Howard v. Gossett, 10 Q.B. 359, 116 Eng. Rep. 139 (Q.B. 1845), rev'd, 10
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lieved that they, too, were endowed with plenary investigative power, which could be enforced by warrant and arrest
for contempt.6

And so, when our federal and state constitutions were
adopted, judges and legislators alike were accustomed to
investigative activities by legislative committees, supported
by the legislatures' own compulsory process. Two of the early
state constitutions expressly conferred investigative powers
on their legislatures; 7 the absence of such provisions from
the federal and other state constitutions merely reflected the
prevalent belief that the investigative function was, of inherent necessity, ancillary to the legislative power. For example,
in 1781 the Virginia House of Delegates empowered its
standing committees to send for persons and papers,' and in
1792 the United States House of Representatives instituted
the first congressional investigation, into the defeat of General St. Clair's army in the Northwest Territory.'
Judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes was, of
course, foreseen and advocated by Hamilton and other proponents of the Constitution.' The structure of that document
soon led to the conclusion that statutes in conflict therewith
Q.B. 411, 116 Eng. Rep. 158 (Ex. 1847); Lines v. Russell, 19 L.T. (O.S.) 364 (N.P.
1852). It was well settled, however, that Parliament's power of arrest for contempt
did not survive the end of the session, and thereafter any one imprisoned by Parliamentary warrant would be released upon application to the courts. See The Earl of
Shaftsbury's Case, 1 Mod. Rep. 144, 86 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1677).
6 Potts, supra note 3, at 708-12. However, when questions later arose before the
Privy Council about the privileges of colonial legislatures, it was held that they
were not endowed with the lex et consuetudo Parliamentii, and therefore could
punish only contempts which actually obstructed their deliberations, and could not
arrest one who refused to answer questions before a legislative committee of inquiry.
Fenton v. Hampton, 11 Moo. P.C. 347, 14 Eng. Rep. 727 (1858); Kielly v. Carson,
4 Moo. P.C. 63, 13 Eng. Rep. 225 (1842); see also Landers v. Woodworth, 2 Can.
Sup. Ct. 158 (1878). Contra: Beaumont v. Barrett, 1 Moo. P.C. 59, 12 Eng. Rep.
733 (1836) ; Ex parte Dansereau, 19 L.C. Jur. 210 (Q.B. Montreal 1875).
7 These were the constitutions of Maryland (1776) and Massachusetts (1780).
See Potts, supra note 3, at 713-14.
8 Potts, supra note 3, at 716.
9

10

3 ANwALs oF CoNG. 490-94 (1792).
See THm FEDERALiST, No. 78 (Hamilton).
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must be treated by the courts as invalid." Once it was settled
that the law-making power was itself subject to judicially
enforceable constitutional limitations, it followed that the
ancillary legislative powers - such as the investigative function - were likewise so limited. This logic was inexorable,
but the actual operations of the few investigations of that
time 2 did not cut so deeply into the national life as to precipitate the issue before the courts. Not until 1821 did the
Supreme Court have occasion to touch the problem, and then
but inconclusively. 3 Thereafter, almost sixty years passed
before the Court squarely held in Kilbourn v. Thompson 4
that the power of Congress, to punish contumacious witnesses
11 In 1795 or earlier for state statutes, and in 1803 for federal statutes. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 320 (U.S. 1795); Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).
12 Landis, supra note 3, at 170-77, lists twelve investigations by the House of
Representatives and one by the Senate from the adoption of the Constitution to
1822. All of these were concerned with the activities of the executive departments
or with military operations.
13 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (U.S. 1821). This decision established the
power of the House of Representatives to arrest and punish by imprisonment for
"contempts committed against themselves," whether within or without the walls of
the House. Id. at 224-25. This power, it was stated, must be exercised in accordance
with the principle "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." Id. at
230-31. Likewise, the British rule that the imprisonment could in no event extend
beyond Parliament's adjournment (supra, note 5) was declared applicable to Congress. Id. at 231.
It has often been said that this case held that the legislature's determination
that a punishable contempt bad been committed is conclusive and not subject to
judicial review. See, e.g., EBERLING, CONORESSIOAI. INVESTIGATIoNS 209, 345, 353
(1928). There are superficial implications to this effect in the opinion: ". . . there
is nothing on the face of this record from which it can appear on what evidence this
warrant was issued. And we are not to presume that the House of Representatives
would have issued it without duly establishing the fact charged on the individual."
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. at 234. Anderson, however, had challenged the warrant
on the ground of total lack of power in the House to punish contempts committed
outside its presence, not the validity of the exercise of the power in the particular
case (which, from other sources, appears to have arisen out of Anderson's attempt to
bribe a member). Carefully read, it is clear that the case holds only that the legislature's warrant will be presumed to be based on valid grounds unless those grounds
are challenged, and does not hold that such a presumption is conclusive.
There appear to be no relevant judicial decisions in the United States prior to
Anderson v. Dunn. It was followed, in a case in which the Senate's power was in
question, Ex parte Nugent, 18 Fed. Cas. 471, No. 10,375 (C.C.D.C. 1848). The
powers of legislative investigating committees do not appear to have been directly
dealt with in any American judicial decision before 1855.
14 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
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before investigating committees by imprisonment for contempt, is subject to judicial review.
If it seems peculiar that the Constitution was in effect for
almost a century before this rule was clearly established, it is
less so when one recalls that only two acts of Congress were
held constitutionally invalid prior to the Civil War. 5 The
growth of constitutional law was brisker thereafter. Furthermore, years before the decision in the Kilbourn case, a
considerable body of law about the investigative powers of
the state legislatures had been developed in decisions by the
courts of New York, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin.' In none
of these cases was the right of judicial review denied, in
several of them it was categorically affirmed, 7 and in the
very first case (Briggs v. Mackellar)'8 the court declined to
require the witness to answer certain questions which were
held not pertinent to the legislative inquiry. Judge Daly's
opinion in the Briggs case (involving an investigation of the
New York City police) is remarkable for its grasp and vision;
he held or declared that (1) investigations backed by compulsory process are "essential to the full and intelligent exercise of the legislative function";' 9 (2) the investigative power
15 Those under review in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803), and
Scott v. Sandford (the Dred Scott Case), 19 Howard 393 (U.S. 1857). From 1860 to
1900, 23 such decisions were rendered, and there were 30 more between 1900 and
1928. See HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 89 (1928).
16 Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 (1871); Sanborn v. Carleton, 15 Gray 399
(Mass. 1860) ; Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray 226 (Mass. 1859) ; People v. Learned,
5 Hun 626 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875); Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb. Pr. 30 (N.Y.C.P.
1855); In re Falvey, 7 Wis. 630 (1858). See also Stewart v. Blaine, 1 MacArth. 453
(D.C. 1874); Irwin's Case (D.C. 1875) (reported only in 3 CONG. REC. 707-27
(1875); Lilley v. United States, 14 Ct. CIs. 539, 542 (1878). Cf. Ex parte McCarthy,
29 Cal. 395 (1866) and State v. Matthews, 37 N.H. 450 (1859), which do not involve legislative investigations, but follow Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (U.S.
1821), in upholding the legislature's power to punish for contempt.
17 Emery's Case, Burnham v. Morrissey, Briggs v. Mackellar, and Irwin's Case,
all supra note 16.
18 2 Abb. Pr. 30, 65 (N.Y.C.P. 1855). Landis, supra note 3, at 167-68, rightly
noted the breadth of Judge Daly's description of the investigative power, but overlooked the limitations he laid down, and was in error in stating that "Prior to 1880
no state decision denies or curtails the exercise" of the power, when in fact this very
decision curtailed the power, as described above in the text.
19- Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb. Pr. 30, 57 (N.Y.C.P. 1855).
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is limited by the Constitution, for "the legislature . . . can
exercise only such powers as have been delegated to it" ;20
(3) legislative committees can require answers only to questions pertinent to the investigation as authorized by the
legislature itself; 2 (4) a witness need not "answer any question that would tend to incriminate him"; 22 and (5) the
courts will, when justiciable controversy arises, review the
exercise of the investigative power. For all that has since
been written, the law has not departed far from these principles, enunciated nearly a century ago.
Whatever may be the merits or defects of the particular
exercise of judicial power in the Kilbourn case, 2 Mr. Justice
Miller's categorical assertion of the power thus found ample
precedent in these state court decisions, as well as in the antecedent logic of Marbury v. Madison.24 Nor was it long before
the Supreme Court found occasion to reiterate the right to
review the exercise of legislative investigative power. The era
of social legislation was beginning, and Congress early empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission and other
administrative agencies to conduct investigations within their
spheres of interest. These inquiries, of course, depended for
their authority on, and were delegations of, the congressional
investigative power, and in this respect were no different from
those conducted by congressional committees. 25 The Court
21

Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.

22

Ibid.

20

Landis, supra note 3, at 159-64, conclusively demonstrated that Mr. Justice
Miller's historical scholarship was grievously at fault in describing Parliament's
power to punish for contempt as an attribute of its ancient judicial, rather than its
legislative, functions. No doubt, too, Mr. Justice Miller's determination, that the
Jay Cooke investigation was judicial rather than legislative in character, was superficial and a priori rather than analytical. These features of the Kilbourn case have
been frequently and, I believe, rightly criticized.
24 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803).
25 Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 437 (1938); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); Attorney-General v. Brissenden, 271 Mass. 172, 171 N.E. 82
(1930); State v. Sims, 130 W.Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805 (1947). This proposition would
seem too plain for argument, and yet numerous discussions of legislative investigative power, including authoritative articles such as the one by Landis, supra note 3,
23
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lost no time in declaring26 that it would "not overlook these
constitutional limitations which, for the protection of personal rights, must necessarily attend all investigations conducted under the authority of Congress."
In 1908 the Court held in Harriman v. ICC,27 that the
Interstate Commerce Commission could compel testimony
in aid of an investigation only if a specific breach of the law
was under inquiry, and in 1924 the same restriction was laid
upon the Federal Trade Commission in FTC v. American Tobacco Co.2" In each case the decision rested on statutory construction, and the bare holding was merely that Congress had
not authorized the Commission to conduct general legislative
investigations. But the opinions, both written by Mr. Justice
Holmes, justified the narrow statutory construction by the
grave constitutional questions which a broader interpretation
would raise, and abounded in emphatic suggestions that the
Bill of Rights would be jeopardized by unlimited legislative
inquiries into "private papers" and by unwarranted "sacrifice
of privacy."
Standing by themselves, some expressions in the Kilbourn,
Harriman, and American Tobacco cases might have cast
doubt on the adequacy of Congress' power to compel testimony in aid of a purely legislative inquiry. But other decisions
during the same general period removed any such doubts. In
1897 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute,
originally enacted in 1857,29 which made it a crime for any
ignore judicial decisions dealing with the power when delegated by the legislature to
and exercised by administrative agencies, which are in fact and logic highly pertinent.
26 ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478 (1894). See also In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n,
32 Fed. 241 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
27 211 U.S. 407 (1908).
28
29

264U.S. 298 (1924).
11 STAT. 155 (1857). This law was codified REv. STAT. §§ 101-04, 859 (1875),

2 U.S.C. §§ 191-94 (1946). Under this statute, of course, the duration of imprisonment of a contumacious witness no longer is limited to that of the congressional
session. Curiously, however, Congress continued to rely on its own power to punish
contumacy by contempt, and no prosecution was brought under the criminal statute
until 1894. Eberling, supra note 13, at 262-68, 358-61. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S.
661 (1897). At the present time the statute is resorted to constantly and the contempt power rarely.
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person to refuse to appear and give pertinent testimony if
subpoenaed by a duly authorized committee of either house
31 the
of Congress.8" And in 1927, in McGrain v. Daugherty,
Court upheld the Senate's action in arresting a witness for
refusing to appear before a committee investigating the administration of the Department of Justice, saying" that "the
power to legislate carries with it by necessary implication
ample authority to obtain information needed in the rightful
exercise of that power, and to employ compulsory process for
that purpose." During the next few years these principles
were reaffirmed in Sinclair v. United States,. and Jurney v.
MacCracken3 4
The Illusion of CongressionalInvestigative Omnipotence
In the light of this background, it might well be wondered
that lawyers and legislators came to disparage the substance
of judicial review of legislative investigations. Furthermore,
this attitude grew up at the very time that the Court, while
sanctioning the exercise of the investigative power, was reiterating its subjection to constitutional limitations, in
language which was equally categorical whether the author
was Mr. Justice Holmes, 5 Van Devanter," Butler, 7 Sutherland, 8 or Brandeis.3 The last-named, indeed, declared in
1935 that any fear that Congress might abuse its powers is
"effectively removed by the decisions of this Court which
hold that assertions of congressional privilege are subject to
In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
31 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
32 Id. at 165.
33 279 U.S. 263 (1929), which affirmed a conviction under the criminal statute
the constitutionality of which had been upheld in In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661
30

(1897).
34
35
36
37
38

294 U.S. 125 (1935) (a contempt case).
See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 165, 176 (1927).
See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291-92 (1929).
See Jones v. Securities Commission, 298 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1936).
39 See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 147-48, 150 (1935).
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judicial review." 40 The core of our inquiry is whether the
courts will pick up Mr. Justice Brandeis' promissory note.
How, then, did the current illusion of congressional omnipotence develop? In origin it was no illusion; it was indignation generated by the scandals of the Harding administration,
disclosed by Senate committee investigations conducted by
Senators Tom Walsh, Burton K. Wheeler, Smith Brookhart
and others. When political stakes are high, the words are hot,
and the investigational techniques were much criticized. In
May, 1924 a federal district judge set aside a committee
subpoena,4 and it was not until January, 1927 that the
Supreme Court reversed his decision and upheld the Senate's
power of inquiry.4" In the meantime, and in defense of that
power against these strictures, a powerful topical article by
the then Professor Felix Frankfurter, and two formidable
historical analyses by Landis and Potts, had made their
appearance in print." The authors did not deny the right of
judicial review, but by virtue of their object they stressed the
breadth of Congress' power of inquiry, and made little or no
mention of limits of the power.
These writings contributed perceptibly to the trend of legal
thinking about congressional investigations that arose naturally from the political dynamism of the first two Roosevelt
administrations. The thirties were years of expanding congressional power, exerted to counteract the blight of economic
depression. In the minds of many, the courts were an obstacle
to the effectuation of the national will. The investigation conducted by Ferdinand-Pecora under the authority of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee rocked the citadels of
financial power and led directly to federal regulation of
securities exchanges and public utility holding companies.
40

Id. at 150.

Ex parte Daugherty, 299 Fed. 620 (S.D. Ohio 1924).
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
43
Frankfurter, Hands Off the Investigators, 38 NEW REPUBLIC 329 (May 21,
124) ; Landis, supra note 3; Potts, supra note 3.
41

42

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

While the Supreme Court was invalidating the National
Recovery and Agricultural Administation Acts,44 Senators
Black, LaFollette, Wheeler, Elbert Thomas, Nye, Truman,
O'Mahoney and others were using the investigative process
to pave the way for new and sweeping assertions of federal
legislative power. The temper of the New Deal was favorable
to the untrammelled use of congressional inquiries to attain
social ends thought desirable, and hostile to the intrusion of
judicial power to check the Congress, whether on legislation
or investigation bent.
In this climate the illusion of investigative omnipotence
flowered. It survived the war, and now confronts us4 at a
time when legislative inquiries are chiefly concerned with
matters which, however labelled, lie close to the roots of
freedom. Many of those who supported investigations in
support of social legislation during the thirties are deeply
disturbed by what they regard as totalitarian tendencies in
the inquiries of the last few years. But if Senators Black,
Lafollette, and Wheeler were entitled to proceed unchecked
by the courts, should not the same apply to Senators McCarthy, Jenner, and McCarran and to Congressmen Dies and
Velde?
No wonder there has been considerable confusion and some
schizophrenia among the "liberals" who feel themselves impaled on these dilemmic horns. 6 A very prominent former
44 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) ; Schechter Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
45 See, e.g., Collins, The Power of Congressional Committees of Investigation to
Obtain Information from the Executive Branch, 39 Gxo. L. J. 563 (1951); Ehrmann,
The Duty of Disclosure in Parliamentary Investigation: A Comparative Study,
11 CHr. L. REv. 1, 117 (1943); Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating
Committee, 33 COL. L. REv. 1 (1933); Morgan, Congressional Investigations and

Judicial Review: Kilbourn & Thompson Revisited, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 556 (1949).
In WECHasLER, THE AGE OF SUsPcIoN (1953) it is stated at 279: "By and large
liberals have believed in giving wide scope to congressional committees."
46 See Boudin, Congressional and Agency Investigations: Their Uses and Abuses,
35 VA. L. REv.143, 145-48, 177-78 (1949) ; CARR, THE HOUSE ComaeBnTEE ON UNASE
AN AcTivinrs 409 (1952). The problem is discussed from the standpoint of
a "lay victim" of a Senate investigation in WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 45, at pp.
260-325.
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attorney4 7 has gone so far as to suggest that the current
excesses of congressional inquisitors were facilitated by the
unqualified support given to New Deal investigations by
"liberals" whose chickens are now coming home to roost.
There is just enough truth in this charge to make it worth
pondering. But however one assays it, the converse is equally
to be reflected upon. The financial, industrial and other
magnates who were the objects of congressional scrutiny in
the twenties and thirties did not lack for "conservative"
lawyers to represent them before the committees or to denounce the investigations in print.4 8 Today the witnesses
before the several committees inquiring into subversive activities - whether because the issues are different, the fees
smaller, or the likelihood of unfavorable publicity greater find few "conservative" counsel available to defend them or
to question publicly the tactics and purposes of the investigators. In short, no one lacks an ox for goring, and the
roosting chickens are no more the exclusive property of
"liberals" than of "conservatives." Sharper tools than these
shopworn labels must be used to lay bare the true issues.
The Scope of JudicialReview
We must start, then, by discarding the popular notion of
investigative omnipotence, and revert to the premise - historically and logically established - that legislative investigative actions, like statutory enactments, may give rise to
justiciable case and controversy and thus precipitate judicial
review. 9 In general, the same constitutional provisions will
relate to both.
47 The Hon. John J. McCloy, speaking before the New York Chamber of Commerce on April 2, 1953 stated: "It is the old matter of whose ox is gored. If the
liberals had been more expressive when the so-called congressional investigations of

the thirties were assiduously violating personal rights and when business was the
target, there would have been less likelihood of excess in this day and age." N.Y.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MONTHLY BuLL. 370-77 (Apr. 1953).

48

See, e.g., Coudert, CongressionalInquisition vs. Individual Liberty, 15 VA. L.

REV. 537 (1929).
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A legislative investigation, or particular questions asked
during its course, may be challenged on constitutional grounds
for lack of power as (1) violative of the principle of separation of powers, because essentially executive or judicial rather
than legislative in nature; (2) beyond the reach of federal or
state power, as the case may be; (3) barred by the guaranties
of free speech and against unreasonable searches and seizures; or (4) barred by the due process clause, if the authorizing resolution is too vague to enable a witness to determine
what matters are within its reach. And, apart from the Constitution, particular questions may be challenged for lack of
power on the ground that they are not germane to the inquiry
which the legislature has authorized to be conducted, by its
own committee or by an administrative agency as the case
may be.
Even if the investigative agency's power to inquire is
clearly established, a witness may decline to answer on a
claim of privilege, and the courts will review the validity of
his claim. The privilege may be personal to the witness, and
by far the best known example is the witness' privilege based
on the Fifth Amendment, to refuse to give testimony that
might tend to incriminate him. Or it may be based upon the
present or past position held by the witness, as in the case of
confidential information obtained by a lawyer or doctor in
his professional capacity, or by a citizen in the course of
49 We are concerned here only with the power of a legislative investigative
agency to compel answers (whether testimonial or documentary) to questions by
arrest for contempt and to punish failure to answer by contempt or criminal process. We are not concerned with the "right" of such an agency to ask questions in
hope or expectation of a voluntary reply and without resort to any form of a compulsory or punitive process. In all probability, the courts would not review the right
to ask, and would hold that no legal right of the witness is affected if no effort is
made to force him to answer. See Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447, 448 (D.C.
Cir. 1953). To the contrary, it might be argued that the mere asking of questions,
particularly at a public session of a legislative inquiry, puts the witness under
pressure to answer, and that a refusal to respond, even if soundly based on the
committee's lack of power to compel a reply, tends to degrade, humiliate, or embarrass the witness. Cf. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 227, 232-33
(1948).
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service on a grand jury. More important for present purposes,
a government official might decline to reveal military or
diplomatic secrets, or a judge to disclose his discussions in
chambers, claiming privilege based on the constitutional
separation of powers.
Most recently, the televising of some congressional committee hearings has focussed attention on the question
whether a witness may challenge the procedure by which the
hearing is conducted. The basis, if any, for judicial review of
investigative procedures is still largely unexplored.
Whether the question is one of power, privilege, or procedure, the form in which judicial review is sought may be
important to the outcome. Today the investigative power is
usually tested by a criminal proceeding against the witness,
but other forms of action have been used in the past, and
quite possibly some form of civil action might now be found
preferable.
That the foregoing matters may all be the basis of judicial
review does not mean that the courts will either freely or
frequently exercise their power by affirmative action to protect witnesses, or by countenancing refusals to answer questions. Reluctance to interfere with the actions of a coordinate
branch of the government will continue, and rightly, to
dictate judicial restraint. In these tempestuous times, forecasts of judicial decision are adventurous, if not reckless.
Some of the considerations which may weigh in the balance
are discussed hereinafter."
Separationof Powers
In the Kilbourn case, the Court held that a congressional
inquiry into the operations of a named "real estate pool," in
which the federal government might have a creditors' interest,
50 Obviously, each of the ensuing subdivisions might itself furnish the material
for a long article. The treatment herein is necessarily brief. Many of these matters
are touched upon in the excellent article by District Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr.,
Standards for CongressionalInvestigations, 3 N.Y. BAR Ass'N RECORD 93 (1948).
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was "judicial" rather than "legislative," and Congress' power
to compel testimony in aid of such an inquiry was disallowed.
The doctrine of separation of powers was, therefore, the constitutional limitation earliest invoked in the Supreme Court
against congressional investigation. The challenge was notably successful, 5 and the broad principles enunciated in the
Kilbourn case have not since been questioned." Their specific
application and the language of the opinion, however, have
been much criticized, 53 and it seems safe to say that only
under very unusual circumstances would the doctrine of
separation of powers today be held to destroy the legislature's
power to conduct an investigation.
So far as intrusion on the sphere of judicial action is concerned, the question is most likely to arise when the legislature (as in the Kilbourn case) initiates an investigation
into charges against specific individuals or institutions, or
arising out of particular episodes. At the present time such
inquiries are usually directed to some act or agency of the
executive branch, and the tendency in these circumstances is
to uphold the power of investigation; even where the purpose
appears to be to try charges rather than obtain information
for legislation, the courts will give the legislature the benefit
of the doubt and presume a legislative object." But where
51 Not merely particular questions, but the entire inquiry, was held beyond the
power of Congress. Furthermore, Kilbourn eventually recovered $20,000 from his
action for false imprisonment against the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Repre*sentatives. See In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 Fed. 241, 253 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
152 Insofar as the Kilbourn case held that (1) the exercise of Congress' power to
punish for contempt is subject to judicial review, (2) Congress' power of legislative
inquiry is, like the law-making power, subject to constitutional limitations, and (3)
the doctrine of separation of powers is one such limitation, it has never been questioned and has repeatedly been reaffirmed. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 377 (1951).
53 See note 23 supra. In United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953), the
Court referred to the "loose language" of the Kilbourn case, as well as to "the
weighty criticism to which it has been subjected" and "the inroads that have been
made upon that case by later cases", citing the McGrain and Sinclair cases.
54 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) ; Attorney General v. Brissenden,
271 Mass. 172, 171 N.E. 82 (1930) ; People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463,
2 N.E. 615 (1885). The more restrictive viewpoint of the Kilbourn case was echoed
in People ex rel. Sabold v. Webb, 5 N.Y. Supp. 855 (Sup.Ct. 1889); State ex rel.
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the subject of such an inquiry is the operation of the judicial
process itself,55 or is a private person or institution,5 6 the
courts are more likely to hold that an investigation can not be
used as a substitute for impeachment in the former case, or
for a trial by the usual processes of law in the latter. Nevertheless, the declared purposes of most present-day investigations are so sweeping and general " that this sort of question
is not likely to arise often.
I am not aware that any investigation has yet been challenged on the ground that it was inherently executive rather
than legislative in character.5 8 Certainly such an attack is
theoretically possible, as if Congress should abolish the Departments of Justice and the Interior, and instead authorize
its own committees to collect evidence of violations of law
in order to prosecute offenders before the courts, institute
Rulison v. Gayman, 31 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 59 (1908); Ex parte Caldwell, 138 Fed.
487 (C.C.N.D. W.Va. 1905), rev'd on other grounds, Carfer v. Caldwell, 200 U.S.
293 (1906), which held that whether the separation of powers provisions of a state
constitution had been violated did not present a federal question under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.
55 There are few decided cases, but it seems highly improbable that the courts
would permit legislative investigation of their handling and disposition of particular
cases. Cf. Commonwealth v. Costello, 21 Pa. Dist. 232 (1911). In June, 1953, seven
federal district judges in California declined to testify under subpoena before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives, on the ground that congressional inquiry
into their handling of tax cases would violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
See Fortas, Outside the Law 192 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 42 (August, 1953).
56 Greenfield v. Russel, 292 Ill. 392, 127 N.E. 102 (1920), wherein an investigation of criminal charges against the Voliva (world-is-flat) church at Zion City was
held, in my opinion rightly, to be "an invasion of the province of the judiciary" and
beyond the power of the state legislature. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
377 (1951), citing Kilbourn and McGrain cases: "This Court has not hesitated to
sustain the rights of private individuals when it found Congress was acting outside
its legislative role."
57 This very generality, however, precipitates a wholly distinct constitutional
question under the due process clause. See heading, "Vagueness and the Due Process
Clause", infra.
58 We are not discussing here the issues which may arise when, in the course of
an investigation admittedly legislative in nature, questions are put which the witness
may refuse to answer on the ground of executive or judicial privilege based on the
separation of powers, or where the investigation is conducted in such a manner as to
destroy or paralyze executive or judicial functions. See Heading, "Executive, Judicial,
and Other Privileges," infra. Here we are concerned only with inquiries which purport to be legislative investigations but are in fact inherently judicial or executive in
their nature and purpose, and are therefore usurpations of power not vested in the
legislature.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

such prosecutions, issue patents to public lands, and enter
into contracts for the construction of dams. Perhaps this
question will become actual rather than theoretical, if the
current proclivity of some congressional committees to amass
individual dossiers and dictate executive action is not soon
checked.
But this takes us into deep and uncharted waters. However such questions might be decided, I think it unlikely,
provided the authorizing resolutions are drafted with reasonable skill, that we shall again see an entire congressional
inquiry invalidated on the ground of separation of powers.
Rather the principle of the Kilbourn case will be applied to
rule out particular categories of questions."O In the course
of the recent Senate investigation of charges of espionage
and subversion in the Army Signal Center at Fort Monmouth, the committee chairman is reported to have put
the following "question" to a witness who had pleaded the
privilege against self-incrimination:"0 "Julius Rosenberg was
convicted as a spy and executed. From your refusal to answer
you apparently engaged in the same type of espionage [sic].
Do you feel you should be walking the streets free - or have
the same fate as the Rosenbergs?" The witness characterized
the question as "outrageous," "1 and the courts would undoubtedly hold that such efforts to convert a legislative
59 Thus, in the course of a legislative investigation concerned with subversive
activities, it might appear from all the attendant circumstances that a particular
witness was summoned (or particular questions were asked), not in aid of the legislative purpose, but in order to inculpate or exculpate the individual. See People ex
rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, 485, 2 N.E. 615 (1885): "An investigation
instituted for the mere sake of investigation, or for political purposes, not connected
with intended legislation, or with any of the other matters upon which the house
could act, but merely intended to subject a party or body investigated to public
animadversion, or to vindicate him or it from unjust aspersions, where the legislature had no power to put him or it on trial for the supposed offenses . ..would
not, in our judgment, be a legislative proceeding, or give to either house jurisdiction
to compel the attendance of witnesses or punish them for refusing to attend." Cf.
Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
60 N.Y. Herald-Tribune, November 26, 1953, p. 34, col. 5.
61 Senator McCarthy defended the question on the ground that "we had 140,000
casualties because of the treason of sleazy characters like you." Ibid.
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inquiry into a tribunal for the trial of criminal charges violate the doctrine of separation of powers, and that the witness (quite apart from the privilege against self-incrimination) could not be required to answer.
The Limits of Federaland State Power
Because of the Constitutional division of power between
the federal and state governments, both federal and state
statutes have often been held unconstitutional on the ground
that they transcended the delegated powers of the federal
government or the reserved powers of the states, as the case
might be. A priori,it might have been expected that the courts
would find equally frequent occasion to invalidate federal or
state legislative investigations on like grounds.
In point of fact, as far as I have been able to determine,
no congressional investigation and but one state investigation62 has encountered judicial disapproval as ultra vires
under the federal system. In Australia, to be sure, it was
squarely held by the Privy Council that a statute, authorizing
an investigation into matters outside the powers delegated
by the constitution to the Commonwealth, was invalid.63 But
it appears unlikely that the bounds of United States congressional power will be so sharply defined for investigative purposes. The pattern of federal power is so expansive and interlaced that it is easy to devise plausible arguments that almost
any inquiry is reasonably related to some federal power,6 4
United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia v. The Colonial Sugar
Refining Co., [1914] A.C. 237 (P.C. 1913). Pursuant to the Royal Commissions Act
of 1902-1912, the Governor-General had initiated an investigation of the sugar
industry in Australia. The 'colonial company brought action to enjoin enforcement
of a summons to testify. That action, by this decision, prevailed.
64 Cf. Wyzanski, supra note 50, at 96, where it is suggested that a congressional
inquiry into state divorce practices might be relevant to federal tax problems. The
trouble with this argument is that it seems to prove too much. Can every married
man be forced to state whether or not he is a member of a group charged as a
"Communist-front organization," on the theory that this might be relevant to the
family credits and exemptions in the federal income tax laws? This is not fanciful;
a bill recently introduced in the legislature of the State of California would require
62

63
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and no doubt the courts will be rightfully cautious, and
unwilling to declare a matter wholly outside the federal or
state investigative power except in a very clear case.
Nevertheless, such cases may arise. In 1936 the Pennsylvania legislature authorized an investigation of the operation
in that state of the federal Works Progress Administration.
Several WPA officials were subpoenaed, but a federal district
court enjoined enforcement of the subpoenas6 5 on the grounds
that: "The complete immunity of a federal agency from state
interference is well established," 66 and "The investigatory
power of a legislative body is limited to obtaining information
on matters which fell within its proper field of legislative
action." 6
This decision seems clearly correct, and the same principle
must logically be applied to federal investigative actions
which intrude in the domain of state power.6 8 Recently, for
example, congressional committees have been investigating
the loyalty of individual teachers and other employees of
municipal school systems in New York City, Philadelphia,
and elsewhere. These were defended on the ground that it
was not the city schools but the individuals that were under
federal scrutiny, yet one may well ponder the result should
the state or city government instruct its teachers not to honor
the federal investigatory process, on the ground that the
state's own loyalty program for teachers was being interfered
everyone claiming any exemption from his state income tax to file a statement under
oath that he does not advncdte the violent overthrow of government. (N.Y. Times,
April-25, 1953 p. 8, col. 4-5). Similarly, the argument is sometimes made that the
lnvestigatjve power is unboumded because it may be used to inquire into the desirability of constitutional amendments. But this is equally self-defeating, as it would
entirely vitiate the constitutional guarantees, and would enable federal and state
investigating committees to roam uninhibited through each other's pastures.
'35 Oited States v.0.vlett, 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
.06 ld.at 741.
6T ld. at 742. 68 Cf. United States, v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 601 (N.D. Ohio 1952),
wherein it is stated that Congress cannot investigate matters exclusively within the
reserved powers of the states, "except as they may affect matters within the scope of
thL powers granted to the federal government."
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with, or that the morale and efficient functioning of the educational system were adversely affected by unwarranted federal interference.
The Firstand FourthAmendments
It is in the area of the constitutional guarantees of freedom,
embodied in the Bill of Rights, that the proximate and most
searching tests of legislative investigative power are occurring. The most intransigent and far flung of the current
inquiries are directed to the political actions, affiliations, and
beliefs of individuals. Thereby the legislature's legitimate
concern for the security and stability of government encounters the prohibitions in the Constitution against laws
"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" and
against "unreasonable searches and seizures." 69
Because legislative inquiries have not, until recent years,
been concerned with subversive activities, the courts are now
encountering almost de novo the equation between the investigatory process and the constitutional guarantees. To be
sure, intimations of the problem can be found more than a
century back.7" Likewise, although the decisions of the Supreme Court limiting the exercise of congressional investigatory power have not, until very recently, been directly
69 Other provisions of the Bill of Rights may, of course, be impinged upon by
the investigative process; an example, the protection against self-incrimination is
discussed under Heading, "The Fifth Amendment: Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," infra. In accordance with the premise, spoken or unspoken, of most of the
cases, the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech is assumed herein to be relevant to testimonial compulsory process, and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures to be relevant to documentary process under a
subpoena duces tecum.
70 In 1832, John Quincy Adams (then a member of the House of Representatives) persuaded the House to amend a resolution, authorizing an investigation of
the Bank of the United States, so as to exclude the supposed possibility of an inquiry
into the religion or politics of the officers of the bank. 8 CONG. DEB. 2160 (1832) ;
see Landis, supranote 3, at 180. Per contra, see In re Falvey, 7 Wis. 630, 642 (1858):
"The very tranquility and existence of the State might require the utmost latitude
as to form and subject matter of the questions proposed to be allowed, in order to
expose and bring to light some wide spread conspiracy to overthrow the government,
or some combination to paralyze its powers by corrupting the high public officers
under the government."
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concerned with the First Amendment, the Kilbourn case and
subsequent decisions of the Court have referred to "the
private affairs of the citizen" or the "right of privacy" in a
manner which reveals acute awareness of the proximity of
the Bill of Rights.7 But the "illusion of investigative omnipotence" enabled it to be written, as recently as 1952, that
"The prevailing opinion in Congress has been that the first
ten Amendments do not protect parties before committees
since these proceedings are only inquiries and bear no relation
to court procedure." 72

The decision in United States v. Rumely 73 has now destroyed that illusion, and has reminded bench and bar that the
First Amendment is applicable to investigations as well as to
statutes.7 4 But the Supreme Court has not yet indicated
where the lines will be drawn, nor has it stated the basic
theory of the First Amendment's applicability to investigations.7" In the meantime two federal courts of appeal, to the
71 See Notes 35-39 supra. "Private affairs" are spoken of in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1881); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-74; ICC v.
Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478 (1894); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1936). Mr.
Justice Butler in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 292 (1929), used the phrase
"right of privacy," following Mr. Justice Holmes' terminology in Harriman v. ICC,
211 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1908).
72 See Driver, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Punish
Contempts of its Investigating Committees, 38 VA. L. REv. 887, 888 (1952).
73 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
74 Strictly speaking, the Rumely case held only that the House resolution instituting the investigation of lobbying activities was to be construed as not authoring the Select Committee to require disclosures of the names of private individuals
who bought literature from Mr. Rumely's Committee for Constitutional Government. However, this narrow construction of the resolution was adopted in order to
avoid "doubts of constitutionality in view of the prohibition of the First Amendment" which the Court found raised by ,the broader construction contended for by
the government. The decision is, therefore, very like the Court's judgments in the
Harrimanand American Tobacco cases, (notes 27 and 28, supra).
75 The Constitution guarantees "freedom of speech"; does this include "freedom
not to speak" as well as "freedom to speak"? Such appears to be the assumption rightful, I believe - in such cases as Kilbourn, Harriman,American Tobacco, Sinclair, and Jones, notes 35 to 38, supra. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas in the Rumely case is based on the premise that forcing X to answer
questions or produce documents, may endanger the freedom of speech of everyone
else, 345 U.S. at 58: "If the lady from Toledo can be required to disclose what she
read yesterday and what she will read tomorrow, fear will take the place of freedom
in the libraries, bookstores, and homes of the land." Finally, it has often been
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counterpoint of vigorous dissents, have upheld the power of
congressional committees to ask a witness whether or not he
is a member of the Communist Party.7" In those cases the
Supreme Court did not see fit to grant certiorari,and it is
perhaps fair to say that in this general area much has been
written in a short time, but little has yet been authoritatively
determined.
In this tense arena, it seems safe only to predict that the
law, to sustain its growth, will feed upon finger-tip judgment
as much as or more than on formal logic. As Mr. Justice
Holmes has stated: 77
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of
principles of policy which are other than those on which the
particular right is founded, and which become strong enough
to hold their own when a certain point is reached.

And so today it is argued on the one hand that the guarantee of free speech is absolute and forbids any legislative
impingement, whether by statute or subpoena, and on the
other that the guarantee must give way whenever the Congress deems that the national security requires its restriction.
Obsession with either "free speech" or "national security"
at the total expense of the other leads to impossible results.7
urged and sometimes held that there is an independent "right of privacy." Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 490, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); see notes 35 to 38
supra; Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 612, 618 (1938) ; Shelby v. Second
Nat. Bank, 19 Pa. D. & C. 202, 209 (1933), positing a "right of personal privacy as
against unlimited and unreasonable legislative or other governmental investigations";
Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (1769): "It is certain
every man has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he pleases: he has certainly a
right to judge whether he will make them public, or commit them only to the sight
of his friends"; Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. RFv. 193
(1890).
76 United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
838 (1948); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 843 (1948); Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950). See also In re Joint Legislative Committee, 285 N.Y. 1,
32 N.E.2d 769 (1941); State v. James, 36 Wash.2d 882, 221 P.2d 482 (1950).
77 Mr. Justice Holmes in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,
355 (1908), quoted in the Rumely case, 345 U.S. at 43, 44.,
78 The temper of the times is such that sacrifice of free speech on the altar of
national security seems the greater present hazard. In upholding the power of the
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At bottom, the two concepts are mutually complementary
rather than conflicting; lawless subversion is as much a
menace to freedom as to security, and irresponsible disregard of the Bill of Rights undermines security as well as
freedom. The Supreme Court will, therefore, avoid the straitjacket of sweeping decisions and categorical determinants.
It is, for example, extremely unlikely that the Court will hold
either that anyone or that no one can be asked whether he
belongs to the Communist Party or other subversive organization. Within the present compass, I can only suggest a few
lines of thought which are likely to carry weight in the judicial
disposition of particular cases.
(1) The courts will allow the investigative process to
impinge on the guarantees in the First and Fourth Amendments only where a substantial showing can be made that the
question asked or document demanded is reasonably related
to the legislative function and necessary to its fulfilment. The
very liberal presumptions in favor of legislative purpose,
House Un-American Activities Committee to compel A witness to state whether or
not he was a Communist, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (per
Prettyman, J.) declared in Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 246 (D.C. Cir.
1948): "If Congress has the power to inquire into the subjects of Communism and
the Communist Party, it has the power to identify the individuals who believe in
Communism and those who belong to the party." From this any of the following
consequences would follow: (a) Congress can take a census of Communists and
former Communists by requiring everyone to declare whether or not he is or has
ever been such; (b) Congress can establish a percentage of Communists by taking
a street-corner poll under oath of every tenth passerby; (c) Congress can put the
question to every resident of a congressional election district that until recently
returned a member of the American Labor Party to office, or to every member of the
New York City Police force; (d) Congress can test the veracity of any witness who
denies either that he is a Communist, or that someone else known to him is a
Communist, by cross-examination and the putting of any question which might be
thought to bear on the witness' truthfulness in answering this type of question,
e.g., whether the witness believes that there is a trend toward democracy in Yugoslavia, or whether he believes that congressional investigative procedures are supporting or undermining constitutional government. In short, an unlimited right of
"identification" under the guise of investigation leads logically to a right of inquisition which is foreign and hateful to our traditions. Cf. Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943): "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
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which have prevailed in cases where the Bill of Rights was
not involved, will not be indulged when a deep issue of
personal freedom is at stake.70 In such circumstances, the
courts will confine the investigatory process to "the least
power adequate to the end proposed." 8o Where personal
inquisition and political aggrandizement masquerade as legislative investigation, or where the legislative benefits are
trivial as compared to the incursion on the Bill of Rights, the
courts will not lend their aid to force the witness to answer.
(2) Whatever the present scope of the "clear and present
danger" rule where statutes or executive acts are concerned,
it will be held to have little if any bearing on investigations.
As Judge Prettyman has repeatedly pointed out, "Inquiry
may be justified when danger is merely potential; danger
must be factually real to justify action." 8
(3) Nevertheless, the apparent imminence or distance of
the particular danger will profoundly affect the courts' willingness to countenance incursions on the Bill of Rights. For
example, a Hollywood script writer might more reasonably
be required to answer to his Communist affiliations, if it had
first been shown that his motion pictures were infused with
subversive propaganda, than in the absence of such a showing.
79 Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 73 A.2d 433, 436 (N.H. 1950) where, dealing with
the disclosure of grand jury proceedings to an investigating committee of the State
Senate, the court said: "Yet that the public interest requires release from the oath
in this regard is not apparent.... The sources of the grand jury's information are
readily available to the legislature. The conclusions of the grand jurors on the topic
mentioned cannot be considered so far essential to the Senate's investigation as to
justify disregard of the requirement of secrecy, or to overbalance the public interest
which occasions it."
80 See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 541 (1917), quoting Anderson v. Dunn,
6 Wheat 204, 231 (U.S. 1821).
81 See his dissenting opinion in National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog,
78 F. Supp. 146, 178 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 334 U.S. 854 (1948), restating the parallel
thought in his opinion for the court in Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 246-47
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
82 Cf. Marshall v. United States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949) and Morford v.
United States, 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949), both of which rely on preliminary
showings of pro-Communist activity as justifying the inquiry. See also United States
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(4) The courts will, I believe, be less rigorous in their
enforcement of the Bill of Rights where the area of inquiry
lies close to the familiar domain of legislative power. They
will, for example, more willingly require a government
employee to disclose his political affiliations than a farmer or
a journalist."
(5) The courts will not look kindly on inquiries conducted in "dragnet" fashion. As a general proposition, Congress
can collect information on a wide scale by questionnaire or
like means,84 but when personal liberties are involved there
must be adequate justification for each particular question.85
(6) The courts will almost certainly not hold that a witness has any special right to refuse to give information, derogatory or otherwise, about other persons. 8 The fact, however, that the witness is asked to be an informer may well
v. Barry, 29 F.2d 817, 822 (C.C.A. 3rd 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 279 U.S. 597
(1929), and Judge Prettyman's dissent in the Maritime Union case, note 81 supra,
176 F.2d at 178: "The court held in the Barsky case that a respectable representation
to Congress of a potential menace to the nation is sufficient warrant for inquiry
into the subject." This suggests the danger of ex parte preliminary showings, which
is even more clearly manifest in the Marshall case, supra, 176 F.2d at 475: "We

agree ... that the Committee had reasonable cause to investigate the Federation,
this cause being in the nature of information given to it by Congressman Martin
Dies on the floor of the House when he was Chairman of the predecessor to the
present Un-American Activities Committee. Any reference to this and other speeches
of Congressman Dies would readily convince any reasonable person that this Committee acted properly in conducting the investigation."
83 On the "identification" theory stated by Judge Prettyman in the Barsky case,
this factor would make no logical difference. But, as has been shown, note 78, supra,
the "identification" theory can not sensibly be pressed to the limit.
84 See Electric Bond and Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 437 (1938); United
States v. Rappeport, 36 F. Supp. 915, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 120 F.2d 236 (2d
Cir. 1941).
85

See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 26 (1936): "The citizen, when interrogated

about his private affairs, has a right before answering to know why the inquiry is
made ....

".

Cf. Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 612 (1938), wherein a

subpoena duces tecurn issued in the course of a legislative investigation was set aside
as too broad, and therefore in violation of the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
88 Cf. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) in which, dealing with
the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court pointed out that "a refusal to
answer cannot be justified by a desire to protect others from punishment, much less
to protect another from interrogation by a grand jury."
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affect the courts' judgment on whether the legislature's interest is sufficient to override the constitutional guarantees.8a
Certainly many other legal principles and circumstantial
factors will come into play88 in the process of judicial adjustment of this vexed and delicate equation. And, as I will
endeavor to show hereinafter, the form of judicial review
may powerfully influence the speed and direction of the law's
treatment of these problems.
Vagueness and the Due Process Clause
It is familiar doctrine that a criminal statute which is so
vaguely drawn that it is difficult to determine what acts are
made criminal thereby is unconstitutional under the due process clause. 9 The criminal statute under which the power of
congressional investigating committees is usually tested today
proscribes refusing to answer questions "pertinent to the subject under inquiry." " If a resolution (of Congress or either
of its houses) authorizing a committee to conduct an investigation is so drawn that it is impossible to determine what
questions are "pertinent", could not a recalcitrant witness
defend himself, if subsequently indicted, by invoking the due
process clause?
The argument is theoretically impregnable but, as yet, no
court has held an authorizing resolution so vague as to nullify
the investigatory process thereunder." It was vigorously
87 This statement is not based on any notion of "sportsmanship." Rather, it
recognizes that governmental compulsion, exercised outside a court of law to force
a citizen to give information about the political actions, affiliations, and statements
of others, might well be a greater hazard to freedom of speech and relaxed social
intercourse than compulsion limited to disclosure of the citizen's own acts, associations, etc. Cf. Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41, 56-58 (1953).
88 For example, it is clear that the courts will be more reluctant to interfere
affirmatively in behalf of an individual claiming injury at the hands of an investigating committee, than merely to refuse to assist the committee in forcing the witness to answer. Cf. Tenney v. Brandlove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
89 Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) ; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255
U.S. 81 (1921).
90 REv. STAT. 102, 104 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. 192, 194 (1946).
91 See Wyzanski, supra note 50, at 95.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

267

pressed on behalf of the defendants in United States v.
Josephson92 and Barsky v. United States," and in each of
them the dissenting judge94 only was persuaded that the
House resolution under which the Committee on Un-American Activities was established 95 is so vague as to furnish "no
ascertainable standard of guilt." 90 In the State of Washington, the validity of an even more general investigatory
resolution has been upheld.97
While the Supreme Court has not yet taken occasion to
rule on this problem, it seems unlikely that investigatory
resolutions will be held to an exacting standard of precision.
However, the importance of the question has been heightened
by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which endows
each standing committee of the Senate with the power to
subpoena witnesses and documents in connection with "any
matter within its jurisdiction." 9 The jurisdiction of each
92 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
93 167 F.2d 241, 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
94 Judge Charles E. Clark of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
Judge Edgerton of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
95 The resolution is now embodied in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,
§ 121(b)(1)(q), 60 STAT. 828 (1946), which authorizes an investigation of "the
extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United
States" and "the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American
propaganda" and related matters.
96 See the dissenting opinion, Barsky v. United States, note 76, supra, 167 F.2d
at 252, 261, where Judge Edgerton wrote: "The term un-American is completely
indefinite. Government counsel do not attempt to define it and concede that they
cannot define it....
In a literal sense whatever occurs in America is American."
The contrary holding of the majority in the Josephson and Barsky cases was reaffirmed in the Lawson and Morford cases, notes 76 and 82, supra.
97 State v. James, 36 Wash.2d 882, 221 P.2d 482, 487 (1950), which upheld a
resolution authorizing the Joint Legislative Fact-finding Committee on Un-American
Activities in the State of Washington to "investigate, ascertain, collate and appraise
all facts concerning individuals, groups or organizations whose activities are such as
to indicate a purpose to foment internal strife, discord and dissension; infiltrate and
undermine the stability of our American institutions; confuse and mislead the people,
and impede the normal progress of our state and nation either in a war time or a
peace time economy."
98 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 134(a), 60 STAT. 831-32 (1946). The
Act does not give the subpoena power to the standing committees of the House of
Representatives, other than the Committee on Un-American Activities. The reason
for this difference does not appear in the legislative history, but I am reliably informed that neither the majority nor the minority leaders of the House (Congressmen Martin and Rayburn) wanted its committees to have uncontrolled and permanent subpoena powers.
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committee is set forth in the Act only in the section specifying
the categories of bills which are to be referred to each. Since
that section was not written with investigations in mind, but
merely the routing of bills, the wording is general to the
ultimate degree; for example, the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare has jurisdiction of "public welfare generally."99 If language such as this is held to support a criminal
prosecution for refusing to answer "pertinent" questions,
obviously there will be nothing left of the due process argument based on vagueness in investigatory authorizations.'
Legislative Authorization and "Pertinence"
Here we are concerned not with the bounds of legislative
investigative power, but with the scope of its delegation to the
investigatory agent, whether it be a legislative committee or
administrative agency. "Pertinency" is simply another way
of expressing the issue of whether a particular question or
demand for a document is within the investigatory mission
authorized by the legislature.
Formally, therefore, the question is not constitutional but
is analogous to statutory construction. Yet the Constitution
lurks nearby. Three times the Supreme Court has resorted
to narrow construction of investigatory authorizations in
order to avoid the constitutional issues which broader interpretation would have raised.'' The question of pertinence
has thus served as a sort of safety valve to relieve the pressure
99

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 102, 60 STAT. 814, 818 (1946). The

jurisdiction of the other standing committees is comparably broad: the Committee
on Armed Services covers "common defense generally," Id. at 815; that on the
Judiciary, "civil liberties," Id. at 818; and the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, "interstate and foreign commerce generally," Id. at 817.
100 Although the Legislative Reorganization Act is startlingly vague and general
in the light of the modern gloss on the due process clause as applied to criminal
statutes, it is not unprecedented in the investigatory field. In 1781, the Virginia
House of Delegates empowered several of its standing committees - e.g. on religion,
courts of justice, and trade - to "send for persons, and records," without further
specification or limitation. See Potts, supra note 3, at 716.
101 In the Rumely, American Tobacco, and Harriman cases, supra notes 1, 35,
and 27, respectively.
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of "hot" issues, and there is no reason to assume that it has
outlived its usefulness for this purpose.
Quite apart from the constitutional overtones, it seems
eminently sound that compulsory investigatory process
should be supported by a clear showing that the testimonial
demand is purposeful and relevant, and not frivolous or unnecessary to the inquiry. So it seemed to Judge Daly, who
first had to grapple with the questions here under discussion."' So it has seemed to the judges in numerous subsequent
cases that hold the government under the burden of proving
pertinency," 3 and without doubt this issue will continue to
furnish a solid basis for judicial review of the investigative
process." 4
The Fifth Amendment: PrivilegeAgainst
Self-incrimination
Although it was questioned in a few old cases °5 whether
the constitutional and common-law bar, against requiring a
person to give evidence against himself, is applicable to legislative investigations, it was early decided in this country that
the privilege is available to witnesses in such investigations. 6
102 In Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb. Pr. 30, 65 (N.Y. C.P. 1855), wherein judge
Daly refused to require the witness to answer questions as to the national origin of
New York City policemen.
103 Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953); United States v.
Barry, 29 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 279 U.S. 597 (1929);
United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952); United States v.
Seymour, 50 F.2d 930 (D. Neb. 1931) ; In re Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 277 Pac. 725
(1929) ; People v. Foster, 236 N.Y. 610, 142 N.E. 304 (1923) ; Matter of Barnes, 204
N.Y. 108, 97 N.E. 508 (1912); Shelby v. Second Nat. Bank, 19 Pa. D. & C. 202
(1933). In the Bowers case, supra 202 F.2d at 452, the court said: "We seriously
doubt whether the 'Do-you-know-a-certain-person' question, without more, can
ever be said to be pertinent for the purposes of a criminal prosecution.... "
104 It should be noted that the issues of congressional or committee power thus
far discussed do not involve the vexing questions of waiver which arise in connection
with the issues of privilege discussed immediately hereinafter. See Bowers v. United
States, 202 F.2d 447, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1953): "... the right to refuse to answer a
question which is not pertinent is not a personal privilege, such as the right to refrain
from self-incrimination, [sic) which is waived if not seasonably asserted. . .
105 See e.g., In re Falvey, 7 Wis. 630, 642 (1858).
106 Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 (1871) ; People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E.
319 (1887); see Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb. Pr. 30, 62 (N.Y.C.P. 1855).
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This has become the firm rule;17 legislative committees generally recognize the legal sufficiency of the claim of privilege,
and the courts uniformly uphold a claim clearly and seasonably made.
Nevertheless, there is no question currently more controversial than the merits of the privilege against self-incrimination as asserted before congressional committees, and the
extra-legal treatment to be accorded those individuals who
"plead the Fifth." "08 The legal and ethical issues have been
widely discussed in print,10 9 and reexamination of the entire
complex problem is beyond the compass of this article.
But from almost any standpoint, the present situation is highly unsatisfactory, for the following reasons among others:
(1) Because of the technical rules relating to waiver of
the privilege, witnesses who might otherwise wish to invoke
it only for a few questions are declining to answer almost any
questions whatsoever." 0
107 Furthermore, in the light of the provisions of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. 2385
(Supp. 1952), a witness may plead the privilege with respect to questions relating
to his connection with the Communist Party. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159
(1950). For other recent decisions dealing with the Fifth Amendment in legislative
investigations, see Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) ; Emspak v. United
States, 203 F.2d 54 (1952), cert. granted, 74 Sup.Ct. 23 (1953); Bart v. United
States, 203 F.2d 45 (1952) ; Quinn v. United States, 203 F.2d 20 (1952) ; Aiuppa v.
United States, 201 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp.
597 (N.D. Ohio 1952); United States v. Jaffe, 98 F. Supp. 191 (D.D.C. 1951);
United States v. Raley, 96 F. Supp. 495 (D.D.C. 1951); United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1951).
108 The most frequent question has been whether their employment, particularly
as teachers, should be continued. Likewise, there has been much debate concerning
the factual inferences which the investigating committee is entitled to draw from a
plea of the Fifth Amendment. See note 109 infra.
109 Particularly valuable studies are those by Professor Bernard D. Meltzer,
Invoking the Fifth Amendment: Some Legal and Practical Considerations, 9 BuLL.
oF Aomoic Sci. 176 (June 1953), and Professor Sydney Hook, The Fifth Amendment: A Moral Issue, N.Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 1, 1953, p. 9. See also Redlich
and Frantz, Does Silence Mean Guilt, 176 TRE NATION 471, (June 6, 1953).
110 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), including the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Black. Such witnesses have been placed in a dilemma which
turns the hearings into a battle of legal wits. Recently, for example, a witness before
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, who denied that he had
committed espionage, was told by the Chairman (Senator McCarthy) that he had
thereby waived his right to plead the privilege when asked other questions. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 26, 1953, p. 1, col. 3.
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(2)
Because of the "illusion of investigative omnipotence"
and other misunderstandings, witnesses are pleading the Fifth
Amendment who are not entitled to, and are not advantaged
thereby. Some, who are guilty of no previous reprehensible,
let alone criminal conduct, are pleading the privilege out
of fear.' Others are invoking it from a misguided notion
that they are thereby challenging the committees' powers on
an issue of principle."' I firmly believe that these confusions
have been sedulously fostered by subversive organizations,
and that their efforts have been facilitated by the unwillingness of so-called "conservative" lawyers to represent or advise
witnesses called before the committees. Such reluctance is in
no true sense "conservative" and can only be described as the
abdication of traditional professional responsibilities."'
(3)
For the foregoing reasons, the principal purpose of
legislative investigating committees in the field of subversion
to wit, the accumulation of information for the guidance
of the legislature - is repeatedly frustrated by interposition
of the claim of privilege.
(4) This, in turn, leads to a mischievous distortion of the
legislative purpose. Some legislators appear to be more
anxious to find witnesses who can be forced to plead the
Fifth Amendment, than to obtain the information which is
thus withheld. Others draw extreme inferences of guilt when
the privilege is invoked, thus vitiating the very basis of the
4
Amendment."
"'I
See the letter of Paul Shipman Andrews, Dean Emeritus of the Syracuse
University School of Law, in the New York Herald-Tribune Oct. 26, 1953, p. 14,
cols. 3-5.
112 In the very first case holding the privilege available to witnesses before legislative investigations, it was pointed out that the claim "relates to the privileges of

the subject, and not to the authority of any tribunal or body before which inquiition may be nade." (Emphasis added). Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, 184 (1871).
113 By no means do I wish to suggest that there are no circumstances in which
a witness before an investigating committee is well advised to plead the privilege
against self-incrimination. My comments herein are directed to the abuse and misuse
of the claim.
114 Thus Senator McCarthy is reported to have declared at a public session of
his investigating committee, after a witness had invoked the privilege: "We have here
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(5)
Finally, the combination of all of these factors leads
to almost hopeless confusion of the public as a whole, and the
employers and friends of privilege-pleading witnesses in particular, concerning the meaning of the plea and the results
that should follow in terms of human intercourse." 5
For the most part, these matters lie outside the area of
possible amelioration by means of judicial review under the
statutes presently in effect." 6 A more flexible form of judicial
review, perhaps better adapted to the present situation, is
discussed hereinafter." 7
A much more fundamental change in the statutory basis,
however, is embodied in the bill which passed the Senate at
the last session of Congress, authorizing the granting of immunity from subsequent prosecution to witnesses before congressional committees, under specified safeguards." 8 This, of
course, would remove the basis for pleading the privilege
against self-incrimination after immunity is granted. While
many difficult questions are involved "' in the proposition
today what would appear to be one of the most active Communist espionage agents
we have run down to date." N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1953, p. 37, col. 6.
115 On the one side it is argued that claiming the privilege raises no question of
suitability for any employment (as if a policeman accused of graft were to plead
the privilege and expect to remain on the force), and on the other that making the
claim is sufficient cause for automatic and immediate disbarment for a lawyer, or
discharge of a teacher. In In re Kaffenburgh, 188 N.Y. 49, 80 N.E. 570 (1907), it was
held that claiming the privilege does not constitute grounds for disbarment. See also,
In re Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940).
116 I.e., the statute punishing refusal to answer as a misdemeanor, REv. STAT. §
101-104 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 191-97 (Supp. 1952), and 18 U.S.C. § 3486
(Supp. 1952).
117 See note 159 infra, and accompanying text.
I18 S. 16, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1952). The debate on and passage of the bill by
the Senate are reported in 99 CONG. REc. 8646-63 (July 9, 1953). In the absence of a
statute of this type, legislative committees do not have the power to grant immunity
from prosecution. Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 744, 177 N.E. 489 (1931).
119 It is not clear, for example, whether Congress has power to grant immunity
from prosecution under state laws. If not, would the privilege continue to be to that
extent available, even after a grant of immunity? In United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141 (1931) it was held that a witness before a federal tribunal cannot refuse
to answer on account of possible incrimination under state law. But where a Senate
investigating committee was interrogating a witness about possible violations of
state law, it was held that the claim of privilege was available to him. United States
v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
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thus embraced, it is in line with existing statutes which give
certain administrative agencies the power to grant immunity
on a parallel basis. 2 ° Despite my great respect for many of
those Senators who opposed passage of the bill,' 2 ' and provided that the bill is amended by the incorporation of safeguards against "immunity baths" and other abuses, I believe
there is good prospect that its enactment into law would do
more good than harm.'22
Executive, Judicial,and Other Privileges
The courts have rarely had occasion to pass on the validity
in legislative investigations of claims of privilege other than
that against self-incrimination. It has been said, for example,
that the attorney-client privilege is of no avail before an
investigating committee.' 23 But to the best of my knowledge
no American court has had occasion to pass on the question,'24
and there appear to be compelling arguments in favor of its
120 See, e.g., 48 STAT. 1096 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 409(1) (Supp.
1953), relating to hearings before the Federal Communications Commission.
121 The Senators who asked to be recorded as opposed to the bill were Magnuson, Kerr, McClellan, Lehman, Jackson, Stennis, Hennings, Murray, Cooper, and
Hayden. The bill in its original and much looser form, as introduced by Senator
McCarran, was opposed by the late Senator Robert A. Taft, N.Y. Times, May 7,
1953, p. 17, col. 1. The safeguarding amendments added on the floor were proposed
by Senators Kefauver and Morse.
122 The parallel between a legislative investigating committee and an administrative agency is far from perfect, as the area in which a committee could grant
immunity is often much wider than that of any single administrative agency, and
elected legislators are prone to deal with these problems on a less judicial and more
political basis than an administrative tribunal. On the floor of the Senate S. 16 was
amended to require the concurrence of the Attorney-General in the proposed grant
of immunity, failing which immunity could not be granted by the committee but
only by resolution of the particular house of Congress by a majority yea and nay
vote. 99 CONG. REc. 8663 (July 9, 1953). In the absence of this and other safeguards
against committee misuse of the power to grant immunity the proposal would be a
very dangerous one. But if the power is intelligently and sparingly used, it should
help to curb the prevalent misuse of the Fifth Amendment, and speed up clarification
of the scope of congressional investigative power.
123 See In re Falvey, 7 Wis. 630, 642 (1858). Also cf. Ex parte Parker, 74 S. C.
466, 55 S.E. 122 (1906); Sullivan v. Hill, 73 W. Va. 49, 55, 79 S.E. 670, 672 (1913).
124 Both Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935) and Stewart v. Blaine, 1
MacArth. 453 (D.C. 1874) have been cited for the proposition that the attorneyclient privilege is inapplicable to legislative investigations, but neither case bears
closely on the question.
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recognition in legislative as well as judicial hearings." 5 The
same is true of grand jury proceedings'26 and the consultations
of judges.' 27
In the immediate future, the sharpest controversies loom in
the sphere of executive privilege over military, diplomatic, and
other confidential matters of state. This brings us back to the
constitutional separation of powers. Quis custodet custodes?
Are the staffs of congressional committees more secure, and
better equipped to ferret out subversion, than the counterintelligence agencies of the executive branch?
Such questions would be precipitated if a congressional
committee should seek judicial aid to enforce subpoenas for
documents or testimony from government officials who were
under instructions from the President not to respond.' One
may safely predict that the courts will go to great lengths to
avoid being caught in a pinch between the legislative and
executive branches. 2 ' In general this will work to the benefit
of the executive, since the Congress would be seeking affirmative assistance from the courts, and a negative reaction would
leave the information undisclosed in executive hands. In all
probability, the courts will not actively assist either the legislative or executive departments to destroy the other branches
of government.' 0
See United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
Opinion of the Justices, 73 A.2d 433 (N.H. 1950).
See Wyzanski, supranote 50, at 99.
128 So far the executive branch has successfully asserted its right to determine
what information of a confidential nature shall or shall not be revealed to the
legislature. Boske v. Commingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); Ex parte Sackett, 74 F.2d
125
126
127

922 (9th Cir. 1935) ; 40 Ops. ATT'y GEN. 45 (1941) ; 25 Ops. ArT'y GEN. 326 (1905)

But a claim of privilege by a minor official concerning matters not involving "thE
security of the State" was rejected in Opinion of the Judges, 328 Mass. 655, 102
N.E.2d 79 (1951). Cf. United States v. Keeney, 111 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1953).
129 The possibilities of acute friction were abundantly demonstrated recentl3
when the Chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee caused subpoenas to be served on ex-President Truman, Mr. Justice Clark, and Governor
James Byrnes of South Carolina. All three refused to comply, on the basis of the
separation of powers or, in the case of Governor Byrnes, the division of powers
between the federal and state governments. See the N.Y. Times, November 12 (p. 1,
col. 5), 13 (p. 1, col. 8; p. 12, col. 7-8; and p. 14, col. 4), and 14 (p. 9, col. 5), 1953.
130 Landis, supra note 3, at 196 declared that Congress "does possess power to

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

JudicialReview of Committee Procedures
Of all facets of the relation between courts and investigating committees, probably the most uncertain and least
developed is that of committee procedures. In historical
perspective it is easy to see why this is so. In the early days
of our republic, legislative investigations were regarded and
conducted as informal fact-finding inquiries, for strictly legislative ends. Although from the very outset reputations were
at stake on disputed matters of fact,131 it seems to have been
the feeling that lawyers had no necessary place in the proceedings. Committee counsel were unknown," 2 witnesses
rarely if ever were accompanied by counsel, and there are
several old cases holding that witnesses before legislative
committees have no right to counsel. 33
But by no means does it follow that witnesses, or persons
under investigation, were then dealt with more arbitrarily or
harshly by the committees than they are today. On the contrary, the atmosphere was, in general, far more courtly, and
persons under inquiry were frequently given the right to call
and cross-examine witnesses"3 4 - a privilege almost unheard
of today.'35
destroy the executive departments," presumably by repealing the statutes and denying the appropriations upon which their existence is predicated and their activities
made possible. It might as well be argued that the executive could destroy Congress
by calling upon the Army to prevent it from assembling. The system of checks and
balances does not rest on logic so much as on common sense. At least one commentator, however, has taken the position that executive privilege to withhold information from the Legislature is narrow or non-existent. See Collins, supra note 45.
131 As in the very first investigation into the causes of and responsibility for
General St. Clair's defeat, note 9 supra.
132 I do not know when investigating committees first employed counsel, but the
first to establish himself as the sparkplug and spokesman of an investigation was
Samuel Untermeyer, in the "Money Trust" hearings conducted by the Pujo Committee of the House of Representatives in 1912. 48 CoNo. REc. 2382-2419 (1912).
'33 People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, 2 N.E. 615 (1885); In re
Falvey, 7 Wis. 630 (1858).
134 For example, in the St. Clair investigation, General St. Clair, the Secretary of
War, and the Quartermaster were all allowed to call and question witnesses. See
ST. CLAIR, A NARRATIVE OF THE MANNER IN VHICH THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE
INDIANS WAS CONDUCTED IN THE YEAR 1791 UNDER THE 'CoMMAND OF MAJOR

GENERAL ST. CLAIR (Phila. 1812). For other examples, see H.R. RT,, W,

Arn

",A
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In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that few
efforts were made to attack committee procedures, by means
of judicial review, until recent years. And for the same reasons, it is natural that, over the course of years, the courts
have come to assume that committees are entitled to determine their own procedures, and that they are now extremely
reluctant to exercise any degree of judicial review thereof.
In the interests of harmonious relations between the legislative and judicial branches there is, to be sure, every reason to
commend such restraint.
The procedures of congressional investigating committees
are, and always have been, entirely unregulated by statute or
rule. Current abuses have now produced a flood of proposals
for "codes" to govern committee procedures.' 36 Analysis of
these is beyond the scope of this paper, but several comments
are relevant to the relation between committees and courts.
The more elaborate and restrictive of these codes might be
useful for congressional self-discipline, but if intended to be
mandatory and to endow witnesses and persons under investigation with legal rights, they would raise extremely difficult problems from the standpoint of judicial review.' Many
Cong., 1st Sess. 153, 292 (1832); H.R. REP. No. 502, 22d Cong., Ist Sess. 48-49
(1832) ; SEN. REP. No. 205, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1860).
135 As late as 1924, witnesses before the Brookhart-Wheeler Committee investigating the Department of Justice were cross-examined by counsel representing
Attorney-General Daugherty. See Hearings before Select Committee on Investigation of Attorney General on Investigation of Hon. Harry M. Daugherty under
S. Rls. 157, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) 6, 233. See Frankfurter, supra note 43,
at 331; "Our course, the essential decencies must be observed, namely opportunity
for cross-examination must be afforded to those who are investigated or to those
representing issues under investigation. Despite Daugherty's statement to the contrary, that opportunity has been scrupulously given by the Brookhart committee."
136 See, e.g., Fortas, supra note 55; Keating, Code For Congressional Inquiries,
N.Y. Times Magazine, April 5, 1953, p. 10, and his proposal to amend the House
rules, embodied in H. REs. 29, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); Congressman Javits'
proposals are reported in the N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1953, p. 13, col. 3; Congressman
Freylinghuysen's proposals publicly announced November 21, 1953, (press release).
137 This would be especially true of rules authorizing persons publicly criticized
in committee hearings to call and cross-examine witnesses, proposed in Congressman
Keating's resolution, supra note 136, and the even more sweeping proposals of Mr.
Fortas, intended to protect witnesses from being surprised by documentary evidence
in the hands of the committee.
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matters which are most susceptible to abuse must remain
within the discretion of the committees," 8 and constant judicial intervention, in the course of which the committees would
increasingly appear in the role of inferior tribunals, would
inevitably cause friction between Congress and the courts.
Furthermore, to a considerable degree these codes are
based on the assumption -

erroneous, I believe

-

that a leg-

islative investigating committee can be made to resemble and
operate like a judicial tribunal. 3 All the statutes, rules, and
regulations in the world can not accomplish this transmigration of the legislative to the judicial soul, and it is a mistake
to try.140 Indeed, one of the dangers of these far-reaching
proposals for "reform" of procedures is that, in the event of
their adoption, the public would conclude that committee
hearings had been turned into real trials, in the course of
which guilt or innocence might be established."' It would, I
138 Certainly the publicity given to accusations against individuals by "committee witnesses," without opportunity for a reply by the victim, manifests one of the
most flagrant and prevalent abuses. The rule proposed by Congressman Keating for
opportunity to call witnesses in behalf of the accused, however, leaves "the extent
to which this privilege may be availed of . . . to the discretion of the committee."
Supra note 136.
139 Indeed, Congressman Freylinghuysen stated that he wished to develop "a
code outlining the rights of witnesses and assuring them protections similar to those
they would receive in a court of law." Mr. Fortas' suggestions, supra note 55, are
based on the premise, with which it is difficult to disagree, that the investigating
committees and loyalty boards are today a much more frequented arena for the
scrutiny of loyalty than the courts; therefore, he maintains, the committees should
not be "outside the law." Much as I agree with the diagnosis, I have little faith in
Mr. Fortas' cure, which is to try to turn the committees into the equivalent of
judicial tribunals.
140
Congressmen are elected politicians, whose duty it is to take into account
the most varied and often conflicting views and pressures in the process of election
and legislation. Judges are under a duty to be non-political, and to exclude matters
from the field of decision in accordance with legal practice. It is a total incompatibility, not of person but of function, that renders futile and unwise any effort to
assimilate a committee to a court. This does not mean that committees should not
function as fairly as possible, but it does mean that investigating committees should
not be expected to ascertain facts as they bear on individual rights and liabilities.
141 Mr. Fortas' recommendations, supra note 55, at 45, even include rules for the
evaluation or rejection of evidence. Hearings on loyalty accusations, he proposes,
should be based only on evidence of "activities inimical to the United States" within
three to five years prior to the hearing, and evidence relating to membership in
"Communist-front" organizations, prior to their "official" recognition as such,
should be excluded, unless the accused was within the "control group."

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

believe, be far more useful for Congress to reaffirm that its
investigations are not trials, and to adopt as legally mandatory a few simple and basic reforms such as those suggested
by Judge Wyzanski.'42
Apart from the proposed "codes," there are two procedural
matters of particular current importance. The intense publicity which has attended some hearings, involving batteries
of newsreel photographers and television cameras, has raised
the question whether a witness has a legal basis for objecting
to any or all of these paraphernalia. Ina recent case in which
two witneses were prosecuted for refusing to answer questions
at a hearing of the Kefauver committee, justifying their
refusal by the concomitant disturbances, District Judge
Schweinhaut dismissed the indictments.'43 He found that no
constitutional question was involved, but was of the opinion
that because of "the concentration of all these elements" calculated "to disturb and distract any witness," a refusal to
testify could not be deemed "wilful" and was "justified." '
On the facts as found,'45 the decision seems to me correct and
a healthy development in judicial review of investigations. I
do not, however, share the views of some that the televising
of congressional investigative hearings should not be permitted,'46 and I do not believe that the courts will lay down
any such prohibition.
The other problem is that presented by the trend toward
in camera investigative hearings. Certainly these "executive
142 Wyzanski, supra note 50, at 106-08, proposes the following three procedural
requirements: (1) the witness may have counsel present at the hearing, (2) he may
file a written statement, and (3) an accurate record of the proceedings shall be kept.
'43
United States v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1952).
144 Id., 107 F. Supp. at 408. In the statute, Rav. STAT. § 102 (1875), as amended,
52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1946), the word "willfully" is grammatically
related to a failure to appear, rather than to a refusal to answer, once present.
145 It should be noted that Judge Schweinhaut did not hold that the presence
of television cameras alone would have required dismissal of the indictment but
relied on the entire concatenation of microphones, flash bulbs and cameras.
146 The question is a complicated one, and has been much debated. See Arnold,
Trial by Television, 187 ATLA-NTIC MONTHLY 68 (June, 1951), and Taylor, The Issue

is not TV, but Fair Play, N.Y. Times Magazine, April 15, 1951, p. 12.
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sessions" have their bona fide uses, when the subject matter
raises security problems, or to permit the committees to follow up leads and examine witnesses without the glare of
publicity.14 As long as the hearings are truly in camera,
the potential benefits probably outweigh the abuses.14 However, a new type of hearing, neither secret nor public, is currently being exploited. Press and public are excluded, although specially invited guests may be present, and at the
end of the hearing the Chairman, or members of the committee or its staff, give the press their version of what has
occurred.149 Outrageous as is this mongrel proceeding, it is not
clear that it can be checked by judicial review, and probably
rectification must be left to Congress itself. 50
The Form of JudicialReview of Legislative Investigations

Before the passage of criminal statutes dealing with recusant witnesses before investigating committees, the committees' authority to compel testimony was usually tested either
by a petition for habeas corpus after a finding of contempt
and incarceration of the witness, or by an action for trespass
and false imprisonment against the sergeant at arms or other
147 In [n re Leach, 197 App. Div. 702, 189 N.Y. Supp. 352 (1st Dep't. 1921) it
was held that a legislative committee has no power to take testimony in camera.
This ground of the decision, however, was not affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 232
N.Y. 600, 134 N.E. 588 (1922), and there is, to the best of my knowledge, no other
judicial support for such a restriction.
148 See Congressman Keating's speech, at the Cornell Law Association, May 15,
1953, wherein it was proposed that executive sessions be held only after approval
in each instance by a majority of the committee, in order to avoid "grave abuses as
a Star-Chamber examination, to probe a 'witness and break him down as a mere
prelude to exposing him to public scrutiny in an open session."
149 See the press accounts of the "executive" hearings of the Senate Permanent
Investigating Subcommittee concerning alleged espionage at Fort Monmouth, N. J.,
and at the General Electric Co.'s plants, reported in the N.Y. Times, e.g., on October
17, 18, 21, 24, 28, and 31, and November 7, 13, 14, 17 and 19, 1953.
150 Prohibitions against this perversion of the investigatory process might well
be included in proposed reforms of investigative procedures by statute or rule. Likewise, it has been argued that procedural abuses "which hold little promise of compensating advantage to the governmental process" are violations of due process.
Note, 26 TuLANE L. REv. 381, 386-88 (1952).
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enforcing officer of the legislature. 5' Both are clumsy and, by
now, obsolete devices, 52 and today criminal prosecutions
under statutes punishing the failure to honor committee
process are the almost invariable form of judicial review.
Despite this popularity, the criminal process leaves much
to be desired. The purpose of a legislative inquiry is to obtain
information; prosecution does not achieve this end directly
or efficiently but, if at all, slowly and uncertainly in terrorem.
Thus the committee's objectives are not well served. Furthermore, a witness who is genuinely doubtful whether the committee has authority to require him to reply, must stake his
judgment against the risk of conviction and imprisonment. As
the Supreme Court has bluntly warned, the witness "was
either right or wrong in his refusal to answer, and if wrong he
took the risk of becoming liable to the prescribed penalty." ...
In view of the numerous, complex, and doubtful questions
of power, privilege, and procedure scanned above, this seems
an unconscionable hazard, particularly since the legislature's
ends are not thereby furthered.' 54 Where the constitutionality
of state statutes or the validity of executive action can only
be tested at the risk of criminal liability or other irreparable
injury, the federal courts have invoked their equity powers
to make possible a safe test by injunctive proceedings.'55
151 There have also been taxpayers' suits to enjoin the expenditure of government funds for allegedly unauthorized investigations. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Russel,
292 I1.392, 127 N.E. 102 (1920), and State v. Frear, 138 Wis. 173, 119 N.W. 894
(1909).
152 The suit for damages does not protect the immediate interest of either the
witness or the legislature. The contempt proceeding requires hailing the witness
before the bar of the legislature, and imprisonment of a witness cannot endure
beyond the end of the legislative session.
153 United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 397 (1933). See also Eisler v. United
States, 170 F.2d 273, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1948): "A person summoned to appear before
a Congressional committee may refuse to answer questions and submit to a court
the correctness of his judgment in doing so, but a mistake of law is no defense, for
he is bound to rightly construe the statute involved."
154 No doubt this is one reason so many witnesses have -pleaded the privilege
against self-incrimination.
155 Ez parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see Frankfurter, The Federal Courts,
58 NEW REPUBLIC 273 (April 24, 1929).
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Logically the same considerations should apply to legislative action when, as in investigations, it operates directly on
individuals. And in fact there is considerable authority for
the issuance of injunctions to enjoin unauthorized proceedings by investigating committees. 5 ' Conceivably this view
might win more authoritative endorsement where a govern-

mental body is the petitioner, and there is a very strong basis
for equitable jurisdiction, perhaps to prevent multiplicity of

suits. "' But the federal courts are not habituated to checking
legislative proceedings, and it seems most improbable that
injunctive process will be held available to review investigative process."'

But should there not be some*form of action, both speedier
and less hazardous than criminal proceedings, to test and
enforce investigatory process? 5 I so believe, and a familiar
form of proceeding, amply tested and supported by abundant
precedent, is ready to hand. It was first evolved for the benefit of administrative agencies (which, of course, have no contempt power), to enable them to compel testimony by applying for a court order, disobedience to which is punished by

the court as a contempt. This is now a standard form of
judicial proceeding in connection with administrative agencies, which has been upheld and applied by the courts in many
156 United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936); Annenberg v.
Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 612 (1938); Shelby v. Second Nat. Bank, 19 Pa. D. &
C. 202 (1933); cf. Brown v. Brancato, 321 Pa. 54, 61, 184 Ati. 89, 92 (1936). The
same has been held, and injunctions issued, when the legislative investigative power
was exercised through an executive agency. FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 Fed. 936
(D.C. Cir. 1923); Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia v. The
Colonial Sugar Refining Co., [1914] A. C. 237 (P.C. 1913). And injunctions have
been granted to restrain a witness from responding to committee process. Strawn v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 3 U.S.L. WEEK 646 (D.C. March 11, 1936); cf. United
States v. Groves, 18 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Pa. 1937).
157 Such were the circumstances in United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736
(M.D. Pa. 1936).
158 Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ; cf.Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
159 In some New York State investigatory proceedings the witness may move to
quash the subpoena. Carlisle v. Bennett, 268 N.Y. 212, 197 N.E. 220 (1935). Such an
action was recently but unsuccessfully attempted in a federal district court in San
Francisco. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1953, p. 9, col. 4.
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cases.' It is entirely adaptable to legislative committee investigations,' 61 and in fact has at least twice been authorized
for joint investigating committees of the two houses of Congress. 62 Utilization of this procedure today, in place of criminal prosecution, would give investigating committees speedy
and direct compulsory process, would relieve witnesses of the
grave and unnecessary hazards which now attend the testing
of legal questions, and the overall result, in Congressman
Keating's words, "would be salutary for everyone concerned." 163
160 The process was held unconstitutional, on the ground that judicial functions
were not involved, in In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 Fed. 241 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887),
but was upheld, on the ground that the court would review the agency's legal authority to obtain the information, in ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894). Such proceedings were involved in the Harriman,American Tobacco, and Jones cases, supra
notes 27, 35, and 38 respectively.
161 In the absence of express authorization, congressional committees have no
power to institute legal proceedings. Reed v County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376
(1928); cf. Ex parte Frankfeld, 32 F. Supp. 915 (D.D.C. 1940); In re Davis, 58
Kan. 368, 49 Pac. 160 (1897).
162 H.J. RES. 237, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 43 STAT. 461-62 (1924), to investigate
land grants to the Northern Pacific Railroad; H.J. RES. 103, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 36
STAT. 871-72 (1910), to investigate the Departments of Interior and Agriculture.
163 See his speech of May 15, 1953 before the Cornell Law Association. The
enormous expansion of this type of litigation underlines the desirability of the
change; from 1857 to 1949 there were 113 prosecutions under the criminal statute;
from 1950 to June, 1952 there were 117. See Quinn v. United States, 203 F.2d 20,
37 n. 100 (D.C. Cir. 1952). If legislation providing for the" granting of immunity
from prosecution is not enacted, the changed mode of enforcement would mitigate
the vexing problem of "waiver." Substantially the same proposal as the one advanced in the text above and by Congressman Keating, was made in 1930 by John
T. Flynn in his article Senate Inquisitors and Private Rights, 161 HARPER's 357
(Aug. 1930).

Judge Wyzanski has opposed this or "any other broadening of judicial review"
as "ill-advised." See Wyzanski, supra note 50, at 105. His principal objection is that
"a witness in a trial court is not allowed thus to interrupt the progress of a case by
appealing a ruling on evidence br procedure." But a legislative investigation is not
a trial court, is not empowerd to decide "cases," and has no appellate superstructure.
The critical difference is that a witness in court who objects to a question does get
an immediate, judicial (though not appellate) determination of his rights. And if the
witness thereafter is recalcitrant, the judge's sentence for contempt'is primarily intended to induce the witness to purge himself by answering, whereas the criminal
proceeding under REv. STAT. §§ 101-104 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 191-94
(1946), has no such effect. With all respect, I think that Judge Wyzanski's objections
are unconvincing.
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Conclusion
In summary, judicial review of the legislative investigative
process is not, as many have imagined in recent years,
evanescent or insubstantial. The courts have asserted a very
solid power of review, and they will continue to do so. They
will dispose of questions under the Bill of Rights by adjusting
the interlocked policies of freedom and security, case by
case. Out of respect for a coordinate branch of government,
they will be reluctant to supervise committee procedures, and
they will not, except in very clear cases, declare an entire
inquiry to be outside the scope of legislative power. But for
all this traditional and well-grounded restraint, the selfaggrandizement and dictatorial tactics of the investigators
will arouse judicial misgivings and provide more frequent
occasion for judicial intervention.'64
I have indicated a few areas in which new legislation can
improve the legislative-judicial relation in the investigative
field, and thereby enable the courts to contribute more speedfly and effectively to the processes of government. These include statutes which would: (1) enable witnesses before legislative investigations to be granted immunity from subsequent prosecution, subject to necessary safeguards against
"immunity baths"; (2) facilitate and expedite judicial review
of questions raised concerning the power and procedures of
investigative committees and the privileges of witnesses before them; and (3) reaffirm the essentially legislative and
non-judicial character of investigatory hearings, and lay down
a few simple procedural requirements for their conduct.
164 Cf. Frankfurter, supra note 43, at 331: "The procedure of Congressional investigations should remain as it is. No limitations should be imposed by congressional
legislation or standing rules. The power of investigation should be left untrammelled." See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44 (1953), per Mr. Justice Frankfurter: ". . .we would have to be that 'blind' Court, against which Mr. Chief Justice
Taft admonished in a famous passage, Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37, that
does not see what '[a]ll others can see and understand' not to know that there is
wide concern, both in and out of Congress, over some aspects of the exercise of the
congressional power of investigation."
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Since the congressional investigation is a legislative device,
it is impossible to eliminate its chronic susceptibility to political exploitation. For the same reason, we cannot put our
sole or even principal reliance on judicial review as a means
of controlling if not curing the disease. "Self-discipline and
the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or
correcting such abuses." 65 But the pillars of society are
mutually supporting; when the judge firmly and dispassionately declares the law, it aids the citizen to combat lawlessness.
Nothing is more dangerous to society, or more helpful to
the Communists, than that high officials, elected or appointed,
should openly display their contempt for law.' 6 Nothing,
that is, unless it be the failure of other officials and of the
citizenry to insist upon the law's vindication. Therefore, the
issues and abuses with which this symposium is concerned
are in no way partisan. When we are talking of the basic
social verities such as respect for law and regard for truth,
there is no room for any outlook but conservatism. Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, must all stand
on conservative ground, and set their faces squarely against
the radical and destructive mischief of these latter-day
"Know-Nothings," of whatever party, who sow suspicion and
fear in our land at a time when foreign perils urgently require
that we be of one mind on the fundamentals of our way of life.
Those who think to profit by investigative excesses and
abuses are the extremists of both left and right, and some
among them are despicably attempting to give a religious and
racial cast to loyalty investigations." 7 In the heat of sensa165

Mr. justice Frankfurter, in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951).
See N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1953, p. 23, col. 1. Replying to a statement by the
Hon. John J. McCloy, Senator McCarthy was reported as saying that he did .not
"give a tinker's dam what the bleeding hearts [sic] say" about his investigative
methods.
167 Such as was the inevitable tendency of the charges of widespread disloyalty
among Protestant clergymen that recently emanated from members or staff members
of the committees headed by Senator McCarthy and Congressman Velde.
166

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

tional charges and counter-charges, it calls for tough minds
and cool heads to avoid these ugly pitfalls. It is earnestly to
be hoped that no religious or racial group or profession will
fall into the error of condemning the investigative process as
such, or claiming immunity from its reach, out of indignation at its abuse. But the committees are within the law, not
above it, and it would be tragic if any religious or racial group
should be led into the false position of condoning contempt
for law, or supporting the transgressions and excesses of irresponsible politicians who are discrediting the investigative
process in order to advance their own ambitions.
In summary, the fact that some individuals called before
the committees may indeed be disloyal or worse, merely emphasizes that open contempt for their legal rights is a greater
threat to the liberties of every loyal citizen than anything
these people could accomplish. Congressional investigations
can and should be a powerful shield to our free institutions,
and it is the task of everyone - judges, legislators, government officials and all foresighted citizens - to join in restoring them to the beneficial fulfillment of their governmental
role, under the leadership of able, moderate and responsible
members of the House and the Senate.16 Such leadership has
never been so needed as it is today, and its reassertion would
be the best way to resolve and dissolve the problems which
have given rise to this symposium.
Telford Taylor

168 To achieve this end, serious consideration should be given to Congressman
Peter Freylinghuysen's recent proposal (supra, note 136) to establish a non-partisan
joint committee on internal security, to replace the numerous committees (including
those headed by Senators Jenner and McCarthy and Congressman Velde) presently
investigating subversive activities.

